society." He provides for this purpose a clear exposition of some of the main outlines of organic evolution together with certain analogies between phases in the evolution of animals and human society.

A short review is scarcely the place in which to discuss how far a study of Biology can be of service to the student of Sociology. We may express doubt, however, whether the information supplied by Professor Dendy is particularly helpful. His biology is excellent; but the series of analogies between the evolution, behaviour, &c., of the lower animals and human affairs can scarcely assist the sociologist, for they are remote analogies, and sometimes strained to breaking point! A knowledge of the phenomena of heredity may be useful to the sociologist in certain circumstances; but when they are made to yield the following analogy (p. 179):—the germ-cells respond very slowly to changes in the environment and do not allow the results of accident and disease to be inherited and may therefore be compared to a House of Lords which vetoes hasty and ill-considered changes of policy, we can only murmur 'c'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la Sociologie.' We find, on p. 48, that the social insects are communists, on p. 25 that 'the great principle involved in capitalism is perhaps as old as life itself.' On pp. 94-5 a consideration of the facts of sex-differentiation teaches us that we cannot make a woman into a man, and vice versa, by Act of Parliament!

G. C. ROBSON.

Heitland, W. E. *Behind and Before: Two essays on the relation of history, politics and eugenist warnings.* At the University Press, Cambridge, 1924. 8vo. Pp. XVI. 166. Price 6s. net.

IN these essays Mr. Heitland discusses fi st the value of historical knowledge to the citizen, politician, and statesman, and then the courses to be adopted in public life in view of the knowledge which has been gained by more scientific study of the effects of modern 'civilized' conditions on the composition of human groups. They are the meditations of a trained historian, who has read and observed widely, and thinks out his conclusions with leisurely care. These conclusions are not very comforting, any more than they are new or strange; they are such as many thoughtful people reach, from less careful observation, and less coherent argument; but for this very reason they are well worth publishing, and should be examined seriously.

History, like any other branch of knowledge, has theoretically its practical applications of discovered principles of human action to the situations of to-day and to-morrow. But are we in a position—and further, can we ever be—to discover such principles, applicable to the new situations of history-that-is-to-be? "In so far as History is past Politics, it is Politics in which causes and motives antecedent to effects and actions can seldom be determined with the moral certainty practically equivalent to proof" (p. 6). "It cannot in any imaginable future attain the status of an exact science" (p. 7). Even Political Economy, "travelling by the road of Economic History, tends to allow a certain elasticity of practice and to become less doctrinaire in character than it was in its earlier days" (p. 8). Yet

History does not, and cannot, carry the attempt to recover "what actually happened" so far as to foreswear criticism, or the application of standards of value, notions (perforce the historian's own) of the rightness and wrongness of what he describes; any more than it can avoid the comparative method of study, however clearly the historian himself may realise that, strictly considered, History does not repeat itself. At best, it would seem, History is an exercise in estimating certain kinds of probabilities, in eliminating habitually and instinctively certain kinds of irrelevancies which fascinate the untrained citizen, in judging—in Aristotelian phrase—"as the sensible man would decide." Whether the decision turns out to be appropriate to the new case, and whether, even if "right" as we say, it comes swiftly enough after apprehension, to "save the situation," depends not on the historian's training, but (after all) on the statesman's intuition.

How then, since in this applied-science sense "virtue" cannot be "taught," are we to make sure that this saving common-sense is distributed in sufficient intensity throughout the community? For in proportion as we historians seem debarred from "educating our masters," it is clearly urgent that we must find some other way to improve them: or at least prevent them from degenerating? Here then looms up the other problem of Mr. Heitland's essays, no less urgent now than it seemed to be in fourth-century Athens. Our historical experience suggests that "there is no external power available for internal reform." Yet reform from within, unless we can get rid of class-selfishness, and the partial standards which it is liable to prescribe, does not seem to promise more than improved classes of existing or preconceived sorts. Is democracy more safely entrusted with power to impose selective limitations on the breeding of new citizens than aristocracy or any other kind of government? This leads to some searching criticism of current proposals; and to the not very helpful conclusion that "the main thing is to gain time for things to rearrange themselves gradually and peaceably" (p. 85). So no doubt they may; so, too, many well-meaning people hoped they would, about 1780; but as Mr. Heitland says later on of the "latent driving-power" which he believes popular government to possess, the difficulty ahead is "to make this power active and keep it in action."

Are we then half-way round the circle and faced with the problem with which we started, of "educating our masters" somehow? Mr. Heitland despairs of a "purely rational influence" in improving average citizens: "at the best it is too slow" (p. 94). He looks rather to "emotional influences"; and, indeed, it is under emotional influence that men-in-the-mass behave more unlike their individual selves, than under any other. The trouble is, as he sees, that the practitioners of emotional influence are so busy rationalising their emotions that they may miss the golden moment to emotionalise their reasoning, and there is now no "unbaptised Constantine" to apply doctrinal learning any more than historical or biological.

The appendices in which collateral problems are discussed apart from the main argument are of the same high quality of scholarly commonsense.

JOHN L. MYRES.